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The asymmetric recognition of gains and losses underlying conservative accounting is 
not taken into account by Jones (1991)-type accrual models. Recently, Moreira (2002) 
and  Ball and  Shivakumar  (2005a)  have  proposed  piecewise  linear  accrual  models 
designed to control for this asymmetric impact.  
Our  paper  first  discusses  the  sign  of  the  expected  measurement  error  in 
discretionary  accruals  (DAC)  estimates  when  models  do  not  control  for  the 
asymmetry underlying conservatism. We find that DAC in firms with bad news (BN) 
are  expected  to  be  understated,  while  those  in  good  news  (GN)  firms  will  be 
overstated.  Based  on  this  original  result  we  empirically  test,  using  graphical  and 
statistical tools, whether piecewise linear accrual models correct such a measurement 
error. The empirical evidence shows mixed results. For GN firms the estimates are 
corrected downwards, as expected; for BN firms, unexpectedly, part of the estimates 
is also corrected downwards. The reason for this unexpected result seems to lie in a 
non-linear relationship between accruals and the proxy for BN that the models are 
unable to control for. Thus, DAC estimates under piecewise linear models are not 
deemed to be of better quality than those of traditional accrual models.   
 
Key words: accrual models; piecewise linear accrual models; conservatism; earnings 
management. 
Data availability: Data are available from the commercial source identified in the paper. 
JEL classification:  M41, C2.    3 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A broad interest in the findings of the literature on discretionary accruals’ estimation 
(DAC) seems to persist, despite the recognized weaknesses in accrual models and the 
poor quality of their estimates (McNichols, 2000).
1 According to Kothari (2001) this 
interest is related to the importance of such models to researchers and to the capability 
of  the  latter  to  draw  correct  inferences  from  capital  market  and  other  research. 
Nevertheless, such interest may also be related to the ongoing discussion on GAAP 
flexibility, and to the impact of earnings management on the quality of accounting 
information and on resource allocation. The comments of Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
point  in  the  same  direction,  suggesting  that  regulators  are  paying  attention  to  all 
earnings management related issues in order to assess whether their beliefs on the 
pervasiveness of this type of managerial behavior make sense. Thus, the improvement 
of available solutions for measuring DAC, or the design of new ones, is an important 
issue on the current accounting research agenda. In-depth, continuous assessment of 
the quality of old and new solutions is also crucial to the perception of insufficiencies 
in the estimates they provide. 
The Jones (1991) accrual model has been a seminal contribution to earnings 
management research. New models have been offered thereafter but most of them are 
based upon it or may be reconcilable with it (e.g. “Modified-Jones”, after Dechow et 
al.,  1995a;  the  “margin  model”,  in  Peasnell  et  al.  2000;  the  “cash  flow”  model; 
“Dechow and Dichev, 2002” model).
2 Although the literature widely recognizes that 
such models do not work well in identifying earnings management practices (e.g. 
                                                            
1 In the literature, as in this paper, “abnormal accruals” and “discretionary accruals” are understood to 
have the same meaning. 
2 Throughout the paper we label them as Jones (1991)-type models or “traditional” models.   4 
Dechow et al., 1995a; Guay et al., 1996; Young, 1999; Thomas and Zhang, 2000), 
they are still in use. Many suggestions for improving accrual models performance 
have been “lost” in the literature. Some, fortunately, are rescued and implemented. It 
is the case of Healy’s (1996:113). In his discussion of the paper by Guay et al. (1996), 
argues that “There are also opportunities for improving the existing accrual models by 
incorporating  the  effect  of  accounting  principles.  For  example,  the  conservatism 
doctrine,  which  requires  firms  to  recognize  gains  and  losses  asymmetrically…”. 
Moreira  (2002)  and  Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2005a)  proposed  accrual  models  that 
attempt to control for conservatism effects. 
Watts (2003) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2005) extensively discuss the 
meaning of accounting conservatism. In the current paper we understand conservatism 
as the prudence managers must use in recognizing expected gains and losses, adopting 
an asymmetric recognition of these earnings components that is more stringent for the 
latter  than  for  the  former.  Expected  losses  (bad  news,  BN)  must  be  recognized 
immediately they become expected, while expected gains (good news, GN) will be 
recognized only when they become realizable/realized. Thus, accounting is timelier in 
recognizing BN than GN, and the impact of conservatism over accruals (earnings) is 
negative.
3  Following  evidence  in  Basu  (1997),  Moreira  (2002)  and  Ball  and 
Shivakumar  (2005a),  amongst  others,  we  relate  the  impact  of  conservatism  to 
accruals. Cash flows are originated on a realization basis and thus are not expected to 
be  contemporaneously  affected  by  conservatism.  It  therefore  seems  intuitive  that 
accrual models should be able to control for this asymmetric impact when estimating 
DAC,  otherwise  accrual  estimates  are  measured  with  error.  Recent  research  (e.g. 
                                                            
3 This definition of conservatism appears in the literature known as “conditional conservatism” (Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005a) or “ex-post conservatism” (Pope and Walker, 2001). It means that the impact 
of conservatism we discuss is  driven  by the accounting  principle with the same  name rather than 
managers’ discretionary actions.   5 
Moreira,  2002;  Ball  and  Shivakumar,  2005a)  has  proposed  solutions  based  on 
piecewise linear accrual models controlling for the asymmetric recognition of gains 
and losses. However, such a solution has not yet been assessed for its impact on the 
quality of DAC estimates. 
In this paper we first discuss the sign of the expected measurement error in 
discretionary accruals (DAC) estimates when no control for the impact on accruals of 
the conservatism is undertaken. We then test whether a solution based on piecewise 
linear accrual models is able to improve the quality of DAC estimates. For firms with 
expected losses (bad news, BN) in the period analyzed, we predict that traditional 
accrual models understate such estimates, and overstate those of firms with expected 
gains (good news, GN). We also predict that better DAC estimates are provided by 
piecewise  linear accrual  models controlling  for  the asymmetric  recognition  of  the 
gains and losses underlying conservatism. 
The analysis shows that traditional accrual models are unable to control for 
the asymmetric recognition of  gains and  losses  underlying conservatism  and their 
DAC estimates contain a conservatism-induced measurement error that is expected to 
understate  such  estimates  for  GN  firms  and  overstate  them  for  BN  firms.  The 
empirical evidence on the quality of DAC estimates derived from piecewise linear 
accrual  models  is  mixed.  For  GN  firms,  these  models  correct  DAC  estimates 
downwards, as predicted. However, for BN firms, unexpectedly, part of the estimates 
is also corrected downwards. The reason for this unpredicted result seems to lie in a 
non-linear relationship between accruals and the proxy for BN that the models are 
unable  to  control  for.  Thus,  the  evidence  does  not  support  the  notion  that  DAC 
estimates  computed  with  piecewise  linear  models  are  of  better  quality  than  those 
provided by basic accrual models.   6 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the impact of 
conservatism on accrual models. In Section 3 we develop and motivate a piecewise 
linear accrual model controlling for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. In 
Sections  4  and  5  we  discuss  the  research  design  and  the  data  sample.  Section  6 
analyses the empirical results, and Section 7 summarizes the main sensitivity tests 
performed. Finally, in Section 8 we present a summary of the main conclusions. 
  
 
2.  The impact on accrual models of the asymmetric recognition of gains and 
losses  
 
In this section we first describe the structure of Jones (1991)-type accrual models. 
Afterwards, we show why these models do not control for the asymmetric recognition 
of gains and losses, and discuss the consequences for the quality of DAC estimates. 
 
2.1. Jones (1991)-type accrual models 
A  wide  range  of  accrual  models  appear  in  the  literature,  ranging  from  a  simple 
random walk of total accruals (DeAngelo, 1986) to the econometrically sophisticated 
Kang  and  Sivaramakrishnan  (1995)  model.
4  Although  the  technical  motivations 
invoked to use more sophisticated techniques are theoretically defensible, the time-
series  data  requirement  associated  with  such  methods  tends  to  act  as  a  practical 
constraint to their widespread use. Moreover, the comparative assessment of accrual 
estimates derived from different  models  (e.g. Thomas and Zhang, 2000)  does not 
                                                            
4 This model uses an instrumental variable technique that attempts to mitigate problems of simultaneity 
and errors-in-variables usually said to affect most accrual methods. An identical econometric technique 
is used by McCulloch (1998) in a model that allows the estimation of the new DAC made in the current 
period and takes into account the reversal of DAC made in prior periods.   7 
show  meaningful  differences between  those of “sophisticated” and those  of “non-
sophisticated” models. This is probably the main reason why a simpler solution, the 
Jones (1991) model, remained popular for more than a decade amongst the models 
that deal with aggregate accruals, and is still one of the most widely  used in the 
literature (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000), acting almost as a benchmark. Because of its 
central role in the literature, and because most other available solutions are based 
upon it, or may be reconcilable with it, the analysis that follows uses this model as its 
starting point.
  
The structure of a Jones-type accrual model (1991) is based on a single linear 
equation that takes the form 
(1)    it it it Y ACC e a a + + = 1 0 , 
where  ACC is  an aggregate measure of accruals, Y is a  vector with  one or  more 
earnings components (“accrual drivers”, such as revenue or cash flow) designed to 
explain the dependent variable,  e  is the residual of the regression,  0 a  and  1 a  are 
parameters, t designates the specific time period, and i represents the firm.
5 These 
parameters can be estimated by running the model for a given firm using time-series 
data or, as is currently more common, cross-sectionally for an industry. It is then 
possible to have, for a firm i, an estimate of its expected (normal) accruals conditional 
on the realized values of Y at period t: 
(2)    it it Y CC A 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ a a + = . 
An estimate of discretionary accruals (e ˆ) is given by: 
                                                            
5 Y may also contain a balance sheet variable. For instance, Plant, Property and Equipment (PPE) used 
in Jones (1991) model. Usually the use of a balance sheet variable, aiming to explain the long-term 
accrual depreciation, involves the use of Total Accruals as the dependent variable of the model.   8 
(3)    it it it it DAC CC A ACC = = - e ˆ ˆ .
6 
Behind  this  simple  way  of  estimating  DAC  ( it e ˆ )  there  are  two  main 
assumptions that may potentially condition the quality of the estimates. Firstly, Y is 
assumed  not  to  be  affected  by  managers’  discretionary  actions  towards  earnings 
management.
7  Otherwise,  the  estimated  coefficients  ( 1 ˆ a )  would  be  biased  and 
inherently  the  same  would  occur  with  the  accruals  estimates  (e.g.  Dechow  et  al., 
1995a).  Secondly,  it  is  assumed  that  omitted  variables  are  uncorrelated  with  the 
explanatory variables in the model. If this does not happen, the estimation suffers 
from an omitted-variables problem, and the coefficients will also be biased (Dechow 
et al., 1995a; Greene, 2000).  
 
2.2. The impact of the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses on accruals, and on 
the estimation of DAC 
The conservatism principle refers to the prudence managers must use in recognizing 
expected  gains  and  losses,  adopting  an  asymmetric  treatment  of  these  earnings 
components  that  is  more  stringent  for  the  latter  than  for  the  former.  Ball  and 
Shivakumar  (2005a)  label  this  accounting  principle  “conditional  conservatism”. 
Losses (bad news, BN) must be recognized immediately they become expected, i.e. 
on a timely basis, while expected gains (good news, GN) need only be recognized 
when they become realizable/realized. Thus, the asymmetric treatment of expected 
losses and gains implies a negative impact on accruals (earnings). The evidence in 
Basu (1997), Moreira (2002) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005a), amongst others, is 
supportive of conservatism effects impacting earnings exclusively through accruals 
                                                            
6 If the model is estimated in time-series, DAC is the residual of the regression. Otherwise, when 
estimated cross-sectionally by industry, DAC can be understood as a forecast error.   9 
(ACC),  consistent  with  cash  flow  recognition  on  a  realization  basis.
8  Moreover, 
because of the BN connection to future events, it seems intuitive to expect that the 
impact of this type of news will affect not only current but also long-term ACC (e.g. 
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005a).  
Let us return to the above model (equation 1) and its accrual drivers. Our aim 
is to provide a better perception of how conservatism may affect the estimation of 
discretionary accruals. First we split this variable into two components as follows: a 
discretionary component (DAC), related to managers’ interventions towards earnings 
management; and a non-discretionary component (NDAC), related to firms’ normal 
business activity. It can then be written: 
    (4)  ACC = NDAC + DAC.
9              
Because of its character, NDAC can be written as a function f that relates this 
non-discretionary component positively to the earnings drivers of normal accruals and 
negatively  to  the  (conditional)  conservatism  embodied  in  the  general  accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP).
10 This is, 
(5)    NDAC = f (accrual drivers ; GAAP conservatism).
11 
12 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Models using instrumental variables are presumed not to invoke this assumption. Nevertheless, there 
is no hard evidence to show that they overcome the problem completely. 
8 The relationship between conservatism and accruals is also intuitive if one considers that the former is 
driven by the revision of expected future cash flows (CFO), and thus does not affect current-period 
CFO. The existence of potential positive correlation between accruals and current-period cash flows, 
discussed in Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) for cases where the downward revision of expected future 
CFO occurs in parallel with an impact in current-period CFO, is only an accidental effect that cannot be 
directly related to the conservatism principle. Moreover, the negative relationship between ACC and 
CFO documented in the literature cannot be used as an argument to defend the position that conditional 
conservatism affects contemporaneous CFO. 
9 For the sake of simplicity and because there is no loss of precision, we do not include the subscripts 
for time and firm.  
10 E.g. Jones (1991); Basu (1997); Peasnell et al. (2000); Moreira (2002); Ball and Shivakumar (2005a). 
11 For the sake of simplicity, we are assuming earnings drivers only (e.g. revenue and cash received, an 
in Peasnell et al., 2000; change in revenue, as in Jones, 1991; cash flows, as in Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). However, as we mention above, if accruals are inclusive of the depreciation charge then a 
balance  sheet  driver  (e.g.  Plant,  Property  and  Equipment)  has  to  be  included  in  the  model.  The 
relationship between ACC and this driver will be negative. 
12 Common to all earnings drivers is the fact that they are recognized in accounting on a “realization 
basis”, i.e. at the moment of their occurrence there is no uncertainty about their amounts and thus they 
are not expected to be contemporaneously affected by conservatism. (e.g. Moreira and Pope, 2005).   10 
Re-writing expression (1) after adjusting it for expressions (4) and (5) allows 
a better perception of the impact of conservatism on accrual models. Expression (1) 
becomes: 
(1’)   NDAC [f (accrual drivers; conservatism)]+DAC =  
= [ ] e a a + +   ivers accrual dr Y  1 0   . 
This  expression  highlights  some  important  aspects  for  the  correct 
understanding of the impact of conditional conservatism on accrual models and their 
estimates. First, accruals are asymmetrically impacted by conservatism. BN will make 
ACC more negative (less positive), while GN will have no expected impact on ACC. 
Conversely,  on  the  right  hand  side  of  this  expression,  the  accrual  drivers  are 
unaffected by conservatism. There is empirical evidence in the literature to support 
the notion that conservatism impacts ACC (e.g. Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 1999; 
Moreira,  2002;  Ball  and  Shivakumar,  2005a)  and  accrual  drivers  are  not 
contemporaneously affected (Moreira and Pope, 2005). 
Second, the differentiated impact of conservatism on both sides of expression 
(1’) suggests that DAC may contain a measurement error. If there is no control for 
conservatism on the right hand side of this expression, and because the accrual drivers 
are independent from conservatism effects, then the intercept and the error term will 
tend  to  pick  up  the  impact  of  conservatism  on  ACC,  thus  influencing  DAC 
measurement.
13 However, this potential effect on the estimation of DAC will be non-
systematic given the asymmetric impact of GN and BN on ACC. The intercept of the 
equation (1’) is expected to be higher for firms with GN than for those with BN, 
consistent with the depressive impact of bad news on ACC. When firms have both 
                                                            
13 If there are uncorrelated omitted variables, then the coefficients of the explanatory variables will be 
unbiased, but the intercept will pick up the mean effect of those omitted variables, unless, of course, 
DAC are intended to offset the negative impact of conservative bad news. In this case the global impact 
on the intercept is difficult to predict.    11 
type of news over time (potentially the most frequent case), or when the model is 
estimated  cross-sectionally  by  industry,  one  may  expect  that,  with  no  control  for 
conservatism, the size of the intercept will lie somewhere in between the extreme 
cases characterized by having only one type of news. Let us call this the “average 
intercept”. Given the asymmetric impact of conservatism on accruals, this intercept is 
understated for GN firms and overstated for BN firms. On examining equations (2) 
and (3), the consequences of this situation for the estimation of DAC are easy to 
predict. For GN firms, estimated normal accruals will tend to be smaller than they 
should be and DAC will be overstated. For BN firms the opposite occurs, and DAC 
are understated. Exhibit 1, Fig. 1, illustrates such a situation. 
Defining  
(6)  NC C DAC DAC DAC - = D , 
where  C DAC   are  discretionary  accrual  estimates  from  models  controlling  for  the 
asymmetric recognition of gains and losses and  NC DAC  are estimates from models 
not controlling for such an asymmetry, we predict that the change in discretionary 
accruals ( DAC D ) will be positive for BN firms and negative for GN firms. 
The expectations we discuss in the current subsection undoubtedly represent 
a  significant  contribution  to  the  literature  and  in  particular  to  empirical  research. 
Firstly, they may help to understand and reinterpret some previous results. Secondly, 
they may foster the improvement of available accrual models and the design of better 
empirical research. Thirdly, they introduce a new question on the quality of accrual 
models that attempt to control for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. 
This paper is a first contribution to answer such a question. 
   12 
  In 1996, Healy, commenting on the paper by Guay et al. (1996), suggested 
that future research  should include  the  impact of conservatism in accrual models. 
Recently two attempts have been made to overcome the insufficiency Healy pointed 
out.  Moreira  (2002)  and  Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2005a)  propose  piecewise  linear 
accrual  models  that  control  for  the  asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses.
14 
Although the first of these studies made an attempt to assess the relative quality of 
C DAC  estimates, neither of them contains a thorough discussion of this quality. We 
intend to do so in this paper. 
In the following section we develop a piecewise linear accrual model as a 
first step in assessing the quality of DAC estimates using these models.  
 
 
3.  A piecewise linear accrual model that controls for the asymmetric recognition 
of gains and losses 
 
In this section we model accruals, and control for the asymmetric recognition of gains 
and losses. The modeling process converges to a Jones-type (1991) accrual model 
structure. This outcome has the advantage that it allows the modeling, and the control 
underlying it, to be extended to many current accrual models. As discussed in the 
previous  section,  the  Jones  (1991)  model  is  a  type  of  umbrella  for  most  accrual 
models in current use.  
 
                                                            
14 Piecewise linear models are recommended to describe nonlinear relationships that contain one or 
more  explanatory  variables  taking  a  two-state-of-the-world  form,  also  know  as  a  “binary  form” 
(Greene, 2000). In the case under analysis, the binary variable is the proxy for conservatism and takes 
the states GN/BN.   13 
3.1. The theoretical model 
Following Dechow et al. (1995b), we assume revenue (total sales) to follow a random 
walk pattern. For firm i belonging to industry j,  
(7)  t ijt ijt e REV REV + = -1 .
15   
Assuming additionally that a proportion of sales remains uncollected at the end of the 
period,  that  a  proportion  of  purchases  remains  unpaid  and  that  there  are  no 
inventories, accruals ( t ACC ) can be expressed as a function of the change in revenue,  
(8)   t t t REV ACC e a a + D + = 1 0 , 
where  0 a  and  1 a  are parameters, and t e is the mean zero regression error term. The 
structure of this model is similar to that of equation (1) in the previous section.
16  
Basu (1997), Pope and Walker (1999) and Moreira (2002), amongst others, 
extensively discuss the asymmetric impact of conservatism on earnings. Based on 
their  findings  and  on  the  definition  of  conservatism  adopted  in  this  paper,  we 
mentioned above that such an impact affects accruals only. Hence, it is possible to use 
the theoretical framework developed in Pope and Walker (1999) and explain accruals 
through a piecewise linear model: 
(9)   t t t t t t u RET D RET D ACC + + + + = * 3 2 1 0 g g g g  
where  m g   are  parameters; t RET   is  a  proxy  for  information  on  the  asymmetric 
recognition  of  gains  and  losses  underlying  conservatism  (good/bad  news); t D is  a 
dummy variable that takes value one when the news is bad, zero otherwise;  t t RET D *  
is an interactive variable reflecting the incremental impact of bad news on  t ACC ; and 
                                                            
15 For the sake of simplicity, and because it does not imply any loss of precision for the analysis, 
hereafter we leave out the subscripts for firm and industry.  
16 The Jones (1991) model can be seen as an empirical application of this model. Its original version 
includes a term (Property, Plant, and Equipment) that controls for the depreciation accrual. Assuming   14 
t u  is an error term with the usual characteristics. Hence, the model relates  t ACC to 
the impact of this asymmetric recognition. 
Given that the impact of conditional conservatism affects accruals only, we 
do not expect the accrual driver in expression (8) to be affected. Empirical evidence in 
Moreira (2002) and Moreira and Pope (2005) supports such an expectation. Hence, 
t REV D  is expected to be economically independent of the variables on the RHS of 
expression (9).
17 This allows us to combine expressions (8) and (9), thereby obtaining 
the following expression: 
(10)   t t t t t t t RET D RET D REV ACC x g g g b b + + + + D + = * 3 2 1 1 0 . 
1 b  is expected to be positive (Jones, 1991). GN, proxied by the positive sign of stock 
returns ( t RET > 0), are not expected to affect  t ACC  and thus  2 g  is expected to be not 
statistically different from zero. Conversely, BN impacts  t ACC  negatively. Because 
the proxy for this type of news is defined in negative terms ( t RET < 0),  3 2 g g +  is 
expected to be positive. This means, given the expectation on  2 g , that  3 g  is predicted 
to be positive. There is no expectation for the signs of  0 b  and  1 g . 
 
3.2.  The empirical version of the model 
To be faithful to the original version of the Jones (1991) model, which includes the 
inverse of the deflator used to mitigate heteroscedasticity ( defl
1 ) rather than a true 
constant, we add this term to the model. However, because there is no theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that  the  measure  of  accruals  (ACC)  does  not  contain  the  depreciation  charge,  equation  (8)  is  the 
complete version of the Jones (1991) model. 
17 The correlation between DREV and RET is fairly small (Table 2, Panel B), consistent with this 
expectation. It is even smaller when we control for good/bad news (untabulated evidence).   15 
reason for forcing the regression through the origin (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000) we also 
retain an intercept term in the regression (e.g. Kang, 1999).
18   
The empirical version of the model is: 
 (11)  t t t t t t t RET D RET D REV defl ACC x g g g b b b + + + + D + ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + = * 1
3 2 1 1 01 0  
Relative  to  the  original  model  (equation  8),  this  final  version  takes  into 
account the impact of the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses on accruals 
(through the coefficients  2 g  and  3 2 g g + , respectively).  
For four other accrual models (the “Modified-Jones model”, after Dechow et 
al., 1995a; the “margin model”, in Peasnell et al., 2000; the “cash flow model”; the 
“Dechow and Dichev, 2002 model”) similar piecewise linear models are constructed 
and tested. All models are regressed cross-sectionally. For each year and industry a set 
of  coefficients  is  estimated,  and  taken  to  compute  each  firm’s  normal  accruals 
( ijt NACC ). The difference between normal and reported accruals will give an estimate 
of  the  forecast  error  (abnormal  accruals),  which  is  a  proxy  for  the  discretionary 
accruals of firm i, from industry j, in year t, 







                                                            
18  According  to  Kang  (1999),  restricting  the  intercept  to  zero  is  a  potential  source  of  bias  in  the 
estimation of abnormal accruals. Increasingly, empirical studies using versions of the model tend to 
include an intercept (e.g. Kasznik, 1999; Hribar and Collins, 2002; Peasnell at al., 2000; Gore et al., 
2001).  In all  these  studies robustness  tests  to  check  the  results  of Jones  (1991)  with  and  without 
intercept do not find significant differences arising from using the intercept. Given the research design 
used in the current study, the results seem unaffected whatever the solution we adopt. Nevertheless, we 
empirically tested all possible combinations (intercept, intercept plus the inverse of the deflator, and the 
inverse of the deflator on its own) and the conclusions are not materially different.   16 
4.  Research Design 
 
4.1. Methodology 
In sub-section 2.2. we discussed the expected sign of DAC measurement error. Given 
the independence between the accrual drivers and the variables controlling for the 
asymmetry underlying conservatism, the statistical difference between DAC estimates 
controlling/not  controlling  for  this  asymmetry  ( NC C DAC DAC DAC - = D )  is  the 
effect  of  such  a  control.  Its  sign  is  then  compared  with  that  of  the  expected 
measurement error in NC DAC . If piecewise models work well, the sign of  DAC D  
should offset that of the measurement error discussed above. The main advantage of 
this approach is that it provides a simple way of testing for the impact of controlling 
for conservatism with no need for particular assumptions on the statistical relationship 
between ACC and their drivers.  
 
4.2. Variables and models: measurement and definition 
 
4.2.1.  Accrual measures  
Exhibit 2, Panel A, contains the definition of the main accounting variables used in 
the analysis, and the corresponding Compustat codes.  
There is no guidance in the literature about the measure of aggregate accruals 
to use, although there is some empirical evidence to suggest that conservatism impacts 
on  both  short  and  long-term  accruals  (e.g.  Moreira,  2002;  Ball  and  Shivakumar, 
2005a). Thus, for testing purposes, we selected three measures of accruals: i) non-cash 
working capital accruals (WCA), which is a measure of current accruals; ii) total   17 
accruals minus depreciation charge (TACC_D),
19 that contains current and long-term 
accruals other than depreciation, and iii) total accruals (TACC).  
 
4.2.2.  Good and bad news proxies 
In  the  previous  section  we  introduced  RET  as  a  proxy  for  information  on  the 
asymmetric recognition of gains and losses underlying conservatism, following the 
work  of  Basu  (1997)  and  Pope  and  Walker  (1999).  RET  are firms’  annual  stock 
returns.  If  they  are  positive,  it  is  assumed  that  they  reflect  economic  good  news 
(expected gains), and if negative, bad news (expected losses). A dummy variable  t D  
that takes value one when  t RET <0 (bad news), zero otherwise, allows us to control 
for returns signs.
20  
As in Ball and Shivakumar (2005a, b), we also use other proxies for the 
asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses:  i)  abnormal  returns,  after  controlling 
firms’ returns for industry performance; ii) cash flows from operations; iii) change in 
cash flows from operations.
21 In all three proxies, the positive sign of the variable is 
taken as GN, the negative as BN.  
 
                                                            
19 The depreciation charge is excluded from TACC_D for three main reasons. Firstly, income statement 
depreciation tends to reflect normal depreciation only. If BN implies extraordinary depreciation, the 
accounting record will tend to be reflected in accruals related to extraordinary items, not in the current 
depreciation charge. Secondly, because accrual models that use total accruals (inclusive of depreciation 
charge) must control for the source of depreciation. According to Young (1999) this tends to produce 
DAC estimates with higher measurement error. Thirdly, because of the visibility and predictability of 
the depreciation charge, its potential use as an instrument for earnings management is limited (e.g. 
Peasnell et al., 2000). 
20 This is not a perfect proxy. Firstly, the use of this proxy in reverse price-earnings relations is not free 
of criticism. Moreira (2002: Part II, Appendix B) discusses and defends its use, and how it performs in 
the presence  of losses. Secondly, as  Roychowdhury and Watts (2005) point out,  RET may reflect 
components (“economic rents of non-separable assets”) not related to conservatism effects, potentially 
introducing noise in the analysis. 
21 Cash flow based proxies are not consistent with the definition of conservatism we discussed above. 
Moreover, those proxies are not independent of the accrual drivers in the model and thus conflict with 
the  basic  assumptions  of  the  regression  analysis  and  with  the  methodology  adopted  in  the  paper. 
Nevertheless, we used them to run a set of preliminary tests.    18 
4.2.3.  Accrual models 
Exhibit 3 introduces the accrual models to be tested. For the sake of simplicity, we do 
not display all the basic models but they may be easily deducted from their piecewise 
versions. For the same reason, we do not show the “Modified-Jones model”, since it is 
the same as in Jones (1991). 
 
4.2.4.   Industry structure 
The cross-sectional regression of accrual models should control for industry effects, 
following current trends in the literature. This involves the adoption of an industry 
structure. The classification widely used in the literature is that of the two-digit SIC 
code, although the drawback of this classification is the small number of observations 
per year that some industries have.
22 To avoid this problem, an important factor in 
(piecewise) models with a larger number of variables, we adopt the classification used 
in Barth et al. (1999). Exhibit 2, Panel B, presents the SIC code composition of each 




5.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 describes the sample selection. All the firms included in the 2004 version of 
Compustat Primary, Secondary and Tertiary, Full Coverage and Research Annual 
Industrial Files were used. Because cash flow from operations (#308) disclosed in the 
Cash Flow Statement (SFAS 95) is unavailable prior to 1987, the sample covers the 
                                                            
22 Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) used 3 digits, and imposed a minimum of 30 observations per industry, 
but did not control for yearly effects, a common feature of this type of empirical research.  
23 Given the specific research design used in the current study, where the piecewise linear version of 
each model (controlling for the impact of conservatism) is tested against its own basic version, the 
industry structure, whatever it may be, does not seem to have a significant impact on the results.    19 
period  1987-2003.
24  As  in  Barth  et  al.  (2001),  their  different  accruals  structure 
justifies the exclusion of firms from financial industries, codes 12 and 13 (Exhibit 2, 
Panel B). The residual character of industry 15 (“other”), which potentially affects the 
reliability of DAC cross-sectional estimates, also led to its exclusion from the sample 
(e.g.  Barth  et  al.,  1999).
25  This  set  of  procedures  originated  a  raw  sample  with 
275,472 firm-years. All variables in the sample are deflated by Average Total Assets 
to mitigate potential heteroscedasticity in the variables (e.g. Gore et al., 2001).
26 After 
deleting missing observations, and mitigating the effect of potential outliers through 
the yearly trimming of the top and bottom 1 percent of each variable (e.g. Barth et al., 
1998), the final working sample has 71,409 firm-years.
27 
28  
Table 2, Panel A, contains some basic descriptive statistics. The mean of 
TACC_D is negative, and the median is also negative, but close to zero. This situation 
shows some left skewness, consistent with the asymmetric conservative recognition of 
unrealized economic losses and gains (e.g. Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005b) 
and is common to the samples of other related studies (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; Thomas 
and Zhang, 2000).  As expected, the change in revenue (DREV) and returns (RETt) 
show  some  right  skewness.  However,  the  sub-sample  of  negative  returns  (RETn) 
                                                            
24 Because of the role cash flow plays in the analysis, we decided not to mix balance sheet and SFAS 
95-cash-flow-data  measures  of  this  variable.  We  attempted  to  avoid  potential  measurement  errors 
arising  from  the  use  of  the  balance  sheet  measure  (Hribar  and  Collins,  2002).  This  attempt  was 
successful for TACC and TACC_D (using the difference between earnings and cash flows), but not for 
WCA (because of the difficulty to get in the database an estimate for the long term accruals). 
25 Some studies do not include the Utilities industry because of the regulated nature of its firms (e.g. 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000). However, as they were deregulated in 1991 
(Blacconiere et al., 2000), we decided to retain them in the sample. Performing the analysis without 
utility industry firms slightly reduces the final sample size but does not materially affect the results. 
26 It is quite common for variables in accrual models to be deflated by lagged total assets (e.g. Thomas 
and Zhang, 2000; Gore et al., 2001). We replicated the analysis using both the deflator variable and the 
lagged market value (e.g. Guay et al., 1996) and find no significant impact on the results.   
27 The sample used to test the “cash flow” and “Dechow and Dichev, 2002” models has 61,720 firm-
years only and has been assembled in the same way as that described above. To test for robustness we 
also repeated the whole analysis using a common sample with 59,455 firm-years.  
28 Performing the analysis for the non-trimmed sample does not materially affect the results.   20 
shows strong left skewness.
29 This indicates that the distributions of positive returns 
and TACC_D do not have a similar shape.   
Panel  B  shows  the  correlations  amongst  the  main  variables.  The  higher 
correlations appear in variables that are strongly related in accounting terms, such as 
EBEI, CFO and accrual measures (TACC_D and WCA). The correlation of RETt 
with the accounting variables is fairly small and tends not to surpass 10 percent. It is 
even  smaller  for  both  measures  of  accruals  (around  3  percent  for  TACC_D). 
However,  the  correlations  are  much  higher  when  we  consider  only  RETn.  For 
example, the correlations with EBEI, TACC_D and CFO are above 20 percent. This 
evidence is consistent with that in Panel A for the differences in the distributions of 
RETt and RETn relative to accounting variables. A relatively high positive correlation 
between RETn and  CFO is  not consistent with conditional conservatism and  may 
reflect  the  existence  in  the  former  variable  of  changes  in  economic  rents 
(Roychowdhury and Watts, 2005). A positive correlation between CFO and TACC_D 
supports  such  an  interpretation.  The  correlation  of  DREV  with  both  measures  of 
accruals is fairly low, and slightly higher for WCA than for TACC_D. This suggests 
that the change in revenue explains current accruals better than long-term accruals 
other than depreciation.    
The sample and industry structures (untabulated) match our expectations. As 
in  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000),  the  number  of  observations  increases  throughout  the 
period, evolving smoothly from around 4 percent in 1989 up to 7 percent in 2003. The 
industry structure shows that one industry, code 7 - Durable Manufactures, dominates 
                                                            
29 To be precise, RETn corresponds to the stock returns sample after the positive returns have been set 
equal to zero. In this way, RETn emulates the variable D1_RET in piecewise accrual models.    21 
all others in terms of size. Other research using the same industry classification shows 
a similar pattern for different time periods (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; Moreira, 2002).  
 
 
6.  Empirical results 
 
We now discuss the main results of the analysis.
30 
 
6.1.  Piecewise linear accrual models that control for the asymmetric recognition of 
gains and losses 
Table 3, Panel A provides a comparison of the results for the Jones (1991) model, and 
its piecewise linear version (EXTJON), using pooled regressions (left columns) and 
year-industry  specific  regressions  (right  columns).  The  measure  of  accruals  is 
TACC_D. It can be observed from the table that the signs of the variables tend to be 
broadly consistent with those discussed earlier in sub-section 3.1. For both regressing 
techniques, the coefficients on good news (RET, stock returns) although statistically 
significant  are  very  small  and  close  to  zero.  The  coefficients  on  the  incremental 
impact of BN (D1_RET) are positive and highly significant, also consistent with our 
expectation. This means that BN have a negative impact on TACC_D, and that the 
GN impact is almost non-existent, both consistent with the asymmetric recognition of 
gains and losses underlying conditional conservatism. The coefficient on DREV also 
coincides with our expectation and remains quite stable when controlling for GN and 
BN, lending support to the assumption about the independence of this variable from 
RET.   
                                                            
30  For  the  sake  of  parsimony,  throughout  this  section  the  statistical  and  graphical  analyses  of  the 
Modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995a) and of the “margin model” (Peasnell et al., 2000) are not 
tabulated or discussed. They very closely follow those of Jones (1991).   22 
The explanatory power of the piecewise linear versions, assessed by the R2 
metrics, is higher than that of the basic accrual model. For the Jones (1991) model it 
increases by 16 and 29 percent for the pooled regression and year-industry specific 
regressions  respectively.  Ball and  Shivakumar  (2005a)  show  similar evidence and 
implicitly interpret it as an improvement in the quality of DAC estimates. We do not 
think that such a conclusion can be drawn from the global R2. We return to this issue 
below.  
Panel B presents similar results for the cash flow and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) models, using pooled regressions. There are two main differences from the 
results in Panel A. First, in the cash flow model, the coefficient on current CFO is 
positive. This result goes against our expectation of a negative coefficient and the 
evidence in Ball and Shivakumar (2005a). These authors argue that in some particular 
cases the relationship between accruals and CFO may be positive. However, despite 
the positive correlation between CFO and TACC_D discussed above in Table 2, Panel 
B, we do not consider that their argument explains the positive coefficient in this 
specific case. Untabulated results for the year-industry regression technique show that 
the  coefficient  on  CFO  is  negative  as  expected.  The  second  difference  is  that 
controlling for GN and  BN  involves  a reduction  in the size of  the  coefficient on 
current CFO, consistent with some degree of correlation between this variable and 
RET. The descriptive statistics in Table 2, Panel B, reveal this.    
Thus, the evidence in Table 3 concerning the piecewise linear accrual models 
is  broadly  consistent  with  the  expected  asymmetric  impact  of  conditional 
conservatism on accruals. BN are more timely recognized in accruals than GN, and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
For the same reason we limit our comments to the results for the TACC_D measure.    23 
the  overall  results  follow  the  evidence  in  Basu  (1997),  Pope  and  Walker  (1999), 
Moreira (2002) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005a), amongst others. 
 
6.2.  Controlling for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses: the statistical 
impact on discretionary accrual estimates 
The evidence discussed so far shows that controlling for GN and BN increases the 
explanatory power of accrual models. Given that such models are regressed cross-
sectionally and discretionary accruals (DAC) are computed for each firm based upon 
year-industry coefficients, one cannot conclude that such an increase in the R2 implies 
higher quality DAC estimates. 
In sub-section 2.2 we discussed the expected sign of the measurement error 
in DAC estimates: for GN firms an overstatement, and an understatement for BN 
firms. This means that controlling for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses 
underlying  conditional  conservatism  must  produce  a  negative  change  in  DAC 
estimates for GN firms ( DAC D < 0) and a positive change for BN ( DAC D > 0). 
Table  4  contains  the  changes  in  DAC  ( DAC D )  estimates  for  the  three 
accrual models we have specifically discussed in previous sub-sections. For each of 
them  and  the  whole  distributions  we  provide  quartiles  of  DAC D   deriving  from 
controlling for GN and BN. For example, the median of the GN sample and the Jones 
(1991)  model  (-0.01)  corresponds  to  the  difference  between  the  median  of  the 
distribution of DAC that controls for conservatism (0.005) and the median of the 
distribution whose estimates have not been controlled for (0.015).  
At first sight, it would appear that the sign of  DAC D  entirely supports our 
predictions. There is a positive change for BN firms and a negative one for GN firms. 
The change is negative for the global sample given the relative size of  DAC D  for   24 
each of the other two sub-samples.  DAC D  medians are all different from zero at the 
conventional levels of confidence. 
The absolute size of  DAC D  is around 1 percent of Average Total Assets 
(ATA) for GN firms, and slightly lower for BN firms. The overall change, for the 
global sample, is around 0.5 percent of ATA. In both cases, it is not a negligible 
measurement  error.  The  size  of  DAC D is  relatively  constant  throughout  the 
distribution of GN firms for all models, but for BN firms it decreases in size as we 
move from the left to the right of the  DAC D  distribution. This shape is more visible 
in the Jones (1991) model distribution.
31  
Although we did not make any specific prediction for the shape of  DAC D  
distribution, we were to a certain extent expecting the absolute measurement error to 
be quite stable across the BN sub-sample, as it is in the GN sub-sample. When we 
trim the sample and retain only firms with deflated earnings in the interval [-25%; 
+25%], the first quartile of the BN sub-sample becomes negative (untabulated result). 
When this interval is restricted even further, the effect is more visible and even the 
median  becomes  negative.  However,  for  the  GN  sub-sample  the  moments  of  the 
DAC D  distribution are not significantly affected by any trimming. Thus, contrary to 
our preliminary conclusion above, these results do not fully support our expectation of 
positive  DAC D  for all moments of the BN sub-sample. 
 
6.3.  Controlling  for  the  asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses:  a  graphical 
analysis 
The evidence provided in Exhibit 4 corroborates what has been said in the previous 
sub-section  about  the  impact  of  controlling  for  good  and  bad  news  on  DAC   25 
estimation.
32  Figure  3.1  shows  the  distribution  of  DAC  by  intervals  of  deflated 
earnings.
33  The  graph  plots  DAC D ,  i.e.  the  difference  between  DAC  estimates 
controlled (C) and not controlled (NC) for BN (dashed line) and GN (solid line). The 
horizontal  (zero)  axis  of  each  graph  corresponds  to  a  situation  where  C  and  NC 
estimates are equal (zero difference), and the vertical distance between the line and 
the axis is the effect of controlling for conservatism news ( DAC D ).  
In section 3 and sub-section 4.1 we discussed how the independence between 
basic accrual drivers and the variables controlling for the asymmetric recognition of 
gains and losses (GN/BN) in the piecewise linear accrual models allows us to obtain 
DAC D  reflecting only the effect of this control.
34 Thus, the shape of the plotted lines 
tends to be driven only by the relationship between GN/BN and the accrual measure 
(TACC_D). It is here that the explanation for such a shape must be sought. 
From the lower part of the graph it can be seen that GN-C tends to be smaller 
than GN-NC ( DAC D < 0) by around 1 percent of Average Total Assets in the central 
part of the distribution. This graphical evidence is consistent with that of Table 4 and 
fully supports our prediction on the sign of the measurement error in DAC estimates 
for GN firms.  
The dashed line in the upper part of the graph represents  DAC D  for BN 
firms. The left part shows  DAC D > 0, consistent with our prediction that DAC not 
controlled for conservatism effects are understated. However, we were not expecting 
DAC D  to decrease from the left to the right of the earnings distribution. Even more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
31 This slightly different shape across models seems to be related to differences in the correlation of 
RET with the other accruals drivers (change in sales for the Jones (1991) model; cash flow for the other 
two models). 
32 For the sake of parsimony this discussion refers only to the mean. However, the evidence for the 
median is not qualitatively different. 
33  The  intervals  are  0.005  width  and  the  earnings  deflator  is  Average  Total  Assets  (ATA).  We 
constrained the distribution to +/- 25 percent for graphical reasons only. 
34 A very low statistical correlation for the Jones (1991) model supports this assumption.   26 
surprising is  the  negative change  that occurs  on most  of the  positive side  of this 
distribution. Exhibit 5 shows comparatively similar graphs for the Jones (1991) model 
(Fig. 4.1) and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (Fig. 4.2). These graphs are 
derived from a common sample with 59,455 firm-years.
35  
A potential explanation for this unexpected outcome may be the market over-
reaction to firms’ unexpected news. This effect is documented in the literature. For 
example, Dechow et al. (2000) refer to it as the “torpedo effect” and discuss it for the 
specific  case  of  firms  failing  to  meet  analysts’  forecasts.  Thus,  mainly  for  firms 
reporting positive earnings (and/or accruals) there may be negative returns that the 
current analysis interprets as reflecting BN and are to a certain extent due to this over-
reaction.
36 
Another potential and related explanation may be earnings management that 
investors perceive as such. Firms tend to avoid reporting losses through fear of market 
(over)reaction and also because of the effect losses may have on their cost of capital 
(e.g.  Burgstahler  and  Dichev,  1997).  They  achieve  this  by  managing  accruals 
upwards.  Although  they  may  end  up  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  earnings 
distribution, if investors perceive this manipulation, firms will be penalized. Also in 
this case, we may have negative returns that do not translate into a negative impact on 
accounting  accruals,  i.e.  negative  returns  that  are  not  related  to  conservatism  bad 
news. Nevertheless, this proposed explanation tends not to be convincing for firms on 
the RHS of the distribution and far from its center.  
                                                            
35 For the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (Fig. 4.2),  DAC D are slightly positive on the right hand 
side of the distribution. Although this result is closer to what we would expect, it seems to be partly 
determined by the correlation between RET and the accrual driver (CFO). In the discussion of Table 3 
results in sub-section 6.1, we highlighted the change in the coefficients of CFO when good and bad 
news are controlled for. Thus, in Figure 4.2 the vertical difference between the lines and the horizontal 
axis  may  not  be  completely  related  to  this  control.  Nevertheless,  even  in  Figure  4.2  there  are 
differences between the left and the right hand side of the distribution that need to be explained.   27 
A third and more plausible explanation builds on the relationship between the 
role of accounting and the market value of equity. Roychowdhury and Watts (2005) 
discuss the theory of conservatism and show that if accounting is not intended to 
report the value of the firm, then the market value of equity is not the appropriate 
proxy for the asymmetric impact of conservatism on earnings (accruals). A change in 
the market value of equity reflects not only the change in the value of separable net 
assets, but also potential changes in economic rents related to non-separable assets 
(goodwill).  Because  only  the  first  of  these  changes  is  caught  by  accounting 
(conditional  conservatism),  the  relationship  between  earnings  (accruals)  and  RET 
weakens when changes in the market value of equity reflect changes in these rents. 
One may expect that throughout the earnings distribution, the proportion of rents in 
RET will not be constant and thus a non-linear relationship between RET and accruals 
will appear. 
To summarize, all the above explanations suggest a non-linear relationship 
between accruals and negative returns throughout the earnings distribution. We now 
discuss some  statistical evidence that lends support  to such  a type of relationship 
between the proxy for BN and accruals (earnings). 
 
6.4. A non-linear relationship between (the proxy for) bad news and accruals 
Table 5 displays GN and BN coefficients by sign of accruals and earnings.
37  As the 
empirical  evidence  is  very  similar  for  all  the  three  models,  we  discuss  the  Jones 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 The evidence in Table 5, showing a negative coefficient for BN and positive accruals (earnings) 
seems to support this explanation. Such evidence implies that on average accruals show a positive 
change (2.7%) for a negative return (-1%), inconsistent with a conservatism explanation. 
37 Similar evidence is produced when we run the models by (up to 5) ranks of these variables.   28 
(1991) model, and the sign of accruals as the partitioning variable, only.
38 
39 It is 
apparent that the proxies for GN and BN have different relationships with accruals. 
For GN the coefficients are close to zero (-0.013 and 0.005, for negative and positive 
accruals  respectively),  consistent  with  the  intuition  underlying  conditional 
conservatism, and not very different across classes based on the sign of accruals.   
Conversely,  for  BN  the  situation  is  mixed.  For  negative  accruals,  the 
coefficient is high (0.199) and different from that for positive accruals (-0.027), which 
is  much  lower  and  closer  to  zero.  As  mentioned  above,  the  sign  of  the  latter  is 
inconsistent with a conditional conservatism explanation.  
This evidence therefore supports the notion that the relationship between the 
proxy  for  BN  and  accruals  (earnings)  is  non-linear,  being  consistent  with  the 
explanation offered in the previous sub-section. From a statistical perspective, when 
no  control  for  the  sign  of  accruals  (TACC_D)  is  undertaken,  the  “average 
coefficient”
40 on BN is understated for firms with negative TACC_D, and overstated 
for  firms  with  positive  TACC_D.  This  evidence  seems  to  be  consistent  with  the 
findings of Roychowdhury and Watts (2005). They show that for firms with higher 
market-to-book  ratios,  potentially  those  with  higher  earnings,  the  rents  of  non-
separable assets are higher and the relationship between earnings (accruals) and RET 
is weaker. Hence, this evidence lends support to the idea that this relationship is not 
linear throughout the earnings distribution. 
In sum, the advantage of a piecewise linear model like those discussed in the 
current paper is that it controls for one type of non-linearity, the asymmetric impact of 
                                                            
38 Untabulated results show that running the piecewise accrual models by ranks of CFO gives relatively 
stable  coefficients  across  ranks  for GN  and BN.  This  means  that  the  non-linearity  of  BN  for the 
earnings distribution is mainly driven by its non-linearity with accruals. 
39 For negative accruals and earnings, the coefficients  on  BN for CF and  DD  models are slightly 
smaller than that of Jones. Also in this case, the difference may be related to the correlation between 
RET and CFO.   29 
conditional  conservatism.  However,  it  does  not  control  for  another  type  of  non-
linearity, the relationship between the proxy for BN and accruals, which is different 
throughout the distribution of accruals (earnings). The result is that it introduces (or 
does not prevent) a measurement error in DAC estimates.
41 Therefore, the evidence 
does  not  support  the  hypothesis  that  DAC  estimates  computed  under  a  piecewise 
linear  model  that  controls  for  the  asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses 
underlying conservatism, mainly those of BN firms, are of better quality than DAC 
estimates derived from basic accrual models. 
 
 
7.  Sensitivity tests 
 
This section summarizes the main additional analyses performed to test the robustness 
of the results. The central role in the analysis of classifying firms according to the 
type of conservatism news they received during the period recommended the usage of 
alternative measures. We used two industry-related stock abnormal return measures as 
alternative proxies for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. However, re-
performing the analysis for these proxies did not qualitatively change the conclusions.  
Following the suggestion in Ball and Shivakumar (2005a), we also adopted 
the sign of (change in) CFO as a proxy for the type of conservatism news firms faced 
during  the  period.
42  The  evidence  we  obtained  differs  greatly  from  what  we  had 
                                                                                                                                                                      
40 Similarly to the discussion in sub-section 2.2, the “average coefficient” is the coefficient estimated 
under a linear regression that does not control for the non-linearity within BN.    
41  We  attempted  to  control  for  the  sign  of  accruals  through  the  use  of  an  interactive  variable 
D1_Ret_A2, which is the product  of D1_RET (the incremental impact  of  BN) and  A2 (a dummy 
variable controlling for the sign of accruals).  However, because the sign of accruals is correlated with 
the accrual drivers (change in sales in Jones, 2001), the methodology we use is no longer appropriate to 
measure the effects of controlling for conditional conservatism. The results we obtained vary only 
slightly from those reported, but are less reliable because of that correlation. 
42 Given the expected independence between the impact of conditional conservatism and cash flow, 
discussed in Section 2, it is difficult to find an argument to support the use of CFO (or its change) as a   30 
expected. For example, using the the Jones (1991) model, the graphical analysis (not 
depicted)  revealed  GN  firms  as  having  positive  mean  DAC D ,  and  BN  having 
negative, precisely the opposite result to the one we were expecting.
43  
We tested for different accrual measures. In addition to TACC_D, whose 
results  have  been  tabulated,  we  also  used  TACC  (i.e.,  total  accruals  inclusive  of 
depreciation charge) and WCA (working capital accruals). The empirical evidence is 
not qualitatively different from that reported in the paper. 
Another  series  of  tests  included  the  use  of  non-trimmed  samples;  lagged 
market value and lagged total assets as deflators; the exclusion of firms from the 
Utilities industry because of the potential impact of regulation; different solutions for 
the Jones (1991) model intercept; no control for yearly and industry intercept effects 
when  models  were  tested  with  pooled  samples;  different  interval  widths  in  the 
graphical  analyses;  varying  numbers  of  rankings  to  test  the  non-linearity  of  the 
relationship between the BN proxy variable and accruals. In all these analyses the 
results were not qualitatively different from those reported. 
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The current study begins by discussing the sign of the measurement error in DAC 
estimates in  accrual  models that  do  not  control  for the  impact  of  the asymmetric 
recognition of gains and losses (conditional conservatism) on accruals. Based on a 
statistical reasoning and a Jones-type model (1991) accrual structure we find that this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
proxy for conservatism news. We discuss this issue above. Some of the coefficients tabulated in Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005a), and in many of our untabulated tests, do not appear to support a conditional 
conservatism explanation.    
43  For  CF  and DD  models,  given the  correlation  between  the  dummy  variable  controlling for the 
asymmetric recognition  of  gains and  losses (the sign  of  CFO/change in  CFO) and accrual  drivers   31 
measurement error varies according to the type of events (GN/BN) firms faced during 
the year. Firms with GN are expected to have overstated DAC estimates, a positive 
error. Firms with BN are expected to face the opposite situation, with understated 
DAC implying a negative error. This is an important and original result. To date the 
literature  has  not  provided  an  assessment  of  the  consequences  to  DAC  estimates 
arising from the absence of controlling for the asymmetric impact of conservatism. 
Based  on  this  result,  the  second aim  of  the  paper  was  to  assess  whether 
piecewise  linear  accrual  models  that  control  for  the  impact  of  this  asymmetric 
recognition (e.g. Moreira, 2002; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005a) are able to offset such 
measurement error. The evidence shows that these models increase the mean size of 
the estimates in GN firms by around 1 percent of Average Total Assets ( DAC D < 0), 
throughout the earnings distribution, consistent with our prediction.  
For BN firms the situation is mixed.  The left part of this distribution shows 
positive  DAC D   (around 2  percent), also consistent  with our  prediction  that DAC 
estimates  of  traditional  models  are  understated.  The  right  part  shows  DAC D <  0 
(around  0.2  percent),  inconsistent  with  the  expected  impact  of  controlling  for  the 
asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses  underlying  conservatism.  This  result 
seems  to  be  related  to  a  non-linear  relationship  between  the  proxy  for  BN  and 
accruals. The fact  that RET may reflect changes in  economic  rents not related to 
changes  in  separable  assets  (Roychowdhury  and  Watts,  2005)  is  one of  the  most 
plausible explanations for this non-linearity. Thus, the poor quality of the proxy for 
the asymmetric impact of conservatism on earnings (accruals) is not overcome by 
piecewise linear accrual models and thus DAC estimates, mainly those of BN firms, 
contain a non-systematic measurement error. This is also an important contribution, as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(CFO), our methodology is not deemed appropriate to conduct the tests seeking evidence on the sign of   32 
it enhances our understanding of the relationship between conditional conservatism 
and the limitations in controlling for it. 
This  paper  can  thus  be  credited  of  two  main  contributions.  Firstly,  it 
introduces to discussion a new question, on the quality of current accrual models that 
attempt to control for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. Secondly, it 
adds to the literature on the poor quality of DAC estimates computed by traditional 
accrual  models,  and  shows  evidence  of  the  measurement  error  they  contain.  In 
summary, the findings of the current study are of importance for future research on 
the  estimation  of  DAC  and  detection  of  earnings  management.  For  accounting 
researchers in particular, they may help in re-interpreting findings from earlier studies 
using  discretionary  accruals,  and  highlight  the  insufficiencies  of  the  technology 
available to produce such estimates. 
Healy (1996:113), in his discussion of Guay et al. (1996) paper, highlights 
the importance of “… improving the existing accrual models by incorporating the 
effect  of  accounting  principles.  For  example,  the  conservatism  doctrine,  which 
requires firms to recognize gains and losses asymmetrically…”. The first step has 
been taken by Moreira (2002) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005a), with their proposal 
of  piecewise  linear  models  designed  to  control  for  the  asymmetric  impact  of 
conditional conservatism. This paper presented evidence on the insufficiencies of such 
solutions. Further steps are needed on what may be a long journey in the search for 
better proxies for the impact on earnings (accruals) of the asymmetric recognition of 
gains and losses underlying conditional conservatism. 
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Description  N. firm-years 
COMPUSTAT (2004) Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary, Full 
Coverage, and Research Annual Industrial Files, after lagging 
variables and deleting financial, real estate and “others” industries 




   
After deleting missing observations  77,336 
Basic working sample after trimming all deflated (by Average Total 
Assets) variables by 1% at top and bottom  
71,409 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Pairwise correlations.  
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (71,409 firm-years, deflated by Average Total Assets) 
 
Variable  MEAN  STD  Q3  MEDIAN  Q1 
EBEI  -0.079  0.393  0.070  0.024  -0.082 
TACC_D  -0.033  0.197  0.034  -0.006  -0.055 
WCA  0.002  0.109  0.046  0.005  -0.032 
DREV  0.092  0.309  0.213  0.066  -0.026 
CFO  0.008  0.280  0.125  0.063  -0.021 
DCFO  0.013  0.229  0.061  0.008  -0.044 
PPE  0.573  0.395  0.824  0.485  0.257 
RETt  0.159  1.077  0.339  -0.015  -0.337 
RETn  -0.186  0.251  0.000  -0.015  -0.337 
 
 
Panel B: Correlations: Pearson (above) / Spearman (below) [71,409 firm-years] 
 
Variable  EBEI  TACC_D  WCA  DREV  CFO  DCFO  PPE  RETt  RETn 
EBEI    0.719  0.283  0.145  0.860  0.011  0.096  0.031  0.264 
TACC_D  0.422    0.489  0.161  0.279  -0.164  0.026  0.027  0.199 
WCA  0.290  0.670    0.322  0.039  -0.164  -0.039  0.067  0.143 
DREV  0.363  0.265  0.354    0.088  0.072  -0.055  0.097  0.159 
CFO  0.700  -0.153  -0.136  0.167    0.141  0.172  0.023  0.213 
DCFO  0.179  -0.298  -0.235  0.172  0.425    0.011  0.044  0.026 
PPE  0.121  -0.011  -0.052  -0.061  0.292  0.026    -0.000  0.131 
RETt  0.295  0.139  0.107  0.189  0.216  0.106  0.078    0.471 
RETn  0.331  0.154  0.108  0.175  0.250  0.092  0.118  0.939   
 
Note: RET are market returns estimated using the Compustat fiscal-year-end closing price (#199) and dividends per 
share (#26). RETt are based on the whole sample of stock returns, and RETn on a sample that has positive returns 
set to zero. EBEI is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; TACC_D is total accruals 
minus depreciation; WCA is working capital accruals;  DREV is change in revenue; CFO is cash flow from 
operations; PPE is property, plant and equipment (#7). All variables are deflated by Average Total Assets (except 
RET). Bold numbers are not significantly different from zero at less than 5%. 
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 Table 3:  Comparison of linear accrual models with their piecewise linear versions 
controlling for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses.  
 
 
Panel A:  Jones (1991) model versus its piecewise linear version (EXTJON). [71,409 
firm-years] 
 
EXTJON:  [ ] t t t t t RET D RET D REV ATA ACC x g g g b b b + + + + D + + = _ 1 1 1








































D1  ?    0.022 
(11.1) 
  0.016 
(5.5) 
RET t  0    -0.006 
(-9.0) 
  -0.007 
(-2.9) 
D1_RET t  +    0.165 
(40.2) 
  0.138 
(8.7) 
           
AdjR
2 (%)    14.8  17.1  11.7  15.1 
 
Note:  The accrual measure is TACC_D; ATA is Average Total Assets; RET are stock returns; D1 is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if RET<0, value 0 otherwise; and D1_RET is an interactive variable equal to D1 
times RET. EXTJON is the Jones (1991) piecewise linear model controlling for good (GN) and bad news (BN). 
The  results  have  been  controlled  for  industry  and  yearly  intercept  effects  (not  tabulated).  The  t-statistics 
(estimated using Fama and McBeth, 1973 methodology for year-industry specific regressions they) are given in 
parenthesis. The definition of other variables is as in Table 2 and Exhibit 2. 
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Panel B: “Cash Flow” (CF) and “Dechow and Dichev (2002)” (DD) accrual models 
and their piecewise linear versions. [61,720 firm-years] 
 
CF:  t t t t t RET D RET D CFO ACC J g g g a a + + + + + = _ 1 1 3 2 1 1 0  
 
DD:  t t t t t t t RET D RET D CFO CFO CFO ACC m g g g f f f f + + + + + + + = + - _ 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 0  
 
 
    POOLED REGRESSIONS 






































D1  ?    0.019 
(9.9) 
  0.018 
(9.8) 
RET t  0    -0.001 
(-1.4) 
  0.004 
(4.7) 
D1_RET t  +    0.135 
(33.2) 
  0.124 
(31.9) 
           
AdjR
2 (%)    8.3  10.5  16.6  18.8 
 
Note:  The accrual measure is TACC_D, RET are market returns, D1 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if RET<0, 
value  0  otherwise;  D1_RET  is  an  interactive  variable  equal  to  D1  times  RET;  and  CFO  is  cash  flow  from 
operations. The results have been controlled for industry and yearly intercept effects (not tabulated). The t-statistics 
are displayed in parenthesis. The definition of other variables is as in Table 2 and Exhibit 2. 
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Table 4: Differences in abnormal accruals estimates arising from controlling for 
the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses, for different samples. 
 
 
    ￿ ABNORMAL ACCRUALS (￿DAC) 










Global Sample:           
   3
rd quartile  ?  - 0.002  - 0.000  - 0.000   
   Median  ?  - 0.005  - 0.003  - 0.002  * 
   1
st quartile  ?  - 0.005  - 0.003  - 0.003   
“Good News” sample [GN]:           
   3
rd quartile  -  - 0.012  - 0.014  - 0.015   
   Median  -  - 0.010  - 0.011  - 0.010  * 
   1
st quartile  -  - 0.010  - 0.012  - 0.012   
“Bad news” sample [BN]:           
   3
rd quartile  +  0.010  0.012  0.013   
   Median  +  0.002  0.007  0.008  * 
   1
st quartile  +  0.004  0.009  0.012   
Pr Median [GN]=[BN]    < 0.0001  < 0.0001  < 0.0001   
 
Notes:  
1)  EXTJON stands for the piecewise linear version of the Jones (1991) model; CF for the Cash Flow model and DD 
for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. They are all regressed cross-sectionally by year and industry; 
2)  “￿ Abnormal Accruals” are the differences between the values of the quartiles for the distribution of abnormal 
accruals estimated using the basic accrual models and the same values when piecewise linear versions controlling 
for good and bad news are used. For example, for EXTJON and GN, the median value -0,01 is the difference 
between the median of the distribution of DAC estimated under control for good and bad news, and the same 
moment of the distribution of DAC when no control is undertaken;  
3)  The accrual measure is TACC_D. Variables and model definitions are as in Exhibits 2 and 3; 
4)  Pr represents the probabilities attached to Wilcoxon tests for the equality in median differences. “ * “ indicates that 
the difference is statistically significant at less than 1 percent;  
5)  For “Global”, GN and BN samples, the number of observations is 71,409; 35,060 and 36,349 for Jones; 61,720, 
29,378 and 32,342 for CF and DD models. 
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Table 5: Good and bad news coefficients by sign of accruals and earnings. 
 
EXTJON:  [ ] t t t t t RET D RET D REV ATA ACC x g g g b b b + + + + D + + = _ 1 1 1
3 2 1 2 1 0  
 
CF:  t t t t t RET D RET D CFO ACC J g g g a a + + + + + = _ 1 1 3 2 1 1 0  
 
DD:  t t t t t t t RET D RET D CFO CFO CFO ACC m g g g f f f f + + + + + + + = + - _ 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 0  
 
 
EXTJON  CF  DD 
Sub-sample  Sub-sample  Sub-sample 
Variables / 
/ Coefficients  Negative  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative  Positive 
Accruals             
D1 ( 1 g )  0.026  -0.004  0.020  -0.003  0.019  -0.002 
Good news ( 2 g )  -0.013  0.005  -0.009  0.005  -0.005  0.007 
Bad News( ) 3 2 g g +   0.199  -0.027  0.125  0.005  0.123  0.007 
AdjR2 (%)  20.9  9.4  21.6  18.4  26.2  21.2 
N. Obs.  38,937  32,472  32,654  29,066  32,654  29,066 
             
Earnings             
D1 ( 1 g )  0.025  0.000  0.024  -0.002  0.021  -0.002 
Good news ( 2 g )  -0.008  0.002  -0.003  0.006  0.001  0.008 
Bad News( ) 3 2 g g +   0.152  -0.020  0.120  0.002  0.126  -0.001 
AdjR2 (%)  14.6  6.8  8.5  54.7  15.1  57.7 
N. Obs.  27,479  43,930  22,885  38,835  22,885  38,835 
 
Notes:   
1)  EXTJON stands for the piecewise linear version of the Jones (1991) model; CF for the Cash Flow model and DD for 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The coefficients are from regressions by year and industry; 
2)  D1 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if RET<0, zero otherwise; RET are market returns estimated using the 
Compustat fiscal-year-end closing price (#199) and dividends per share (#26);  D1_RET is an interactive variable 
equal to D1 times RET; accruals measure is TACC_D and Earnings is EBEI;  
3)  Bold numbers are not significantly different from zero at less than 5%. 











Exhibit  1:  Traditional  accrual  models:  the  impact  of  uncorrelated  omitted 





















Fig. 1:  When accrual models do not control for conservatism, and firms have both GN and BN over time, the size 
of the intercept will pick up the effected of the uncorrelated omitted variables and lie somewhere in between the 
extreme cases characterized by having only one type of news (aAverage). This intercept is understated for GN 
firms and overstated for BN firms. The consequences are as follows. For a GN firm and a given value of the 
accrual driver (Y’), the estimated normal accruals [E(ACC)] is “b”. The vertical difference between “b” and “a” is 
the understatement in normal accruals, translating into an overstatement of DAC (not visible in the graph). For BN 
firms the opposite occurs, and DAC are understated.   43 
Exhibit 2: Earnings structure and definition of variables. Industry composition. 
 
Panel A: Earnings Structure and definition of variables 
  Variable  Description  Compustat annual codes 
  CFO  Cash flow from operations   #308 
  WCA  (non-cash) Working capital accruals  (D#4-D#1)-(D#5-D#34-D#71) 
  TACC  Total accruals  #123-#308 
  TACC_D  Total Accruals minus Depreciation  #123-#308+#14 
  EBEI  Earnings before ext. items disc. operat.   #123 
       
+  CR  Cash received  #12-D#151  
+  DREC  Change in trade receivables  D#151 
=  REV  Revenue (sales)  #12 
-  EXP  Expenses (administrative and selling)  #12-#13 
-  DEP  Depreciation and amortization  #14 
-  OER  Other expenses net of other revenues  #13-#123-#14 
=  EBEI  Earnings before ext. items disc. operations   #123 
 
Note: Compustat codes: #1 (cash and short-term investments); #4 (total current assets); #5 (total current liabilities); #34 




Panel B: Industry composition (Barth et al., 1999) 
Code  Industry  Primary Sic Codes 
1  Mining and Construction  1000-1999, except 1300-1399 
2  Food  2000-2111 
3  Textiles, printing and publishing  2200-2799 
4  Chemicals  2800-2824, and 2840-2899 
5  Pharmaceuticals  2830-2836 
6  Extractive Industries  2900-2999, and 1300-1399 
7  Durable Manufacturers  3000-3999, except 3570-3579, and 3670-3679 
8  Computers  7370-7379, 3570-3579, and 3670-3679 
9  Transportation  4000-4899 
10  Utilities  4900-4999 
11  Retail  5000-5999 
12  Financial Institutions  6000-6411 
13  Insurance and real estate  6500-6999 
14  Services  7000-8999, except 7370-7379 
15  Other  > 9000   44 
 





Jones (1991) model [JONES] 
 
t t t REV defl ACC e b b b + D + ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + = 2 1 0 1  
 
 
Piecewise linear Jones (1991) model [EXTJON] 
 
t t t t t RET D RET D REV defl ACC x g g g b b b + + + + D + ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + = _ 1 1 1
3 2 1 2 1 0  
 
 
Piecewise linear “margin model” (Peasnell, et al. 2000) [PPY] 
 
t t t t t t RET D RET D CR REV ACC x g g g g g g + + + + + + = _ 1 1 5 4 3 2 1 0  
 
 
Piecewise linear Cash Flow model [CF] 
 
t t t t t RET D RET D CFO ACC J g g g a a + + + + + = _ 1 1 3 2 1 1 0  
 
 
Piecewise linear Dechow and Dichev (2002) model [DD] 
 






1)  Definition of variables: RET are stock returns estimated using the Compustat fiscal-year-end closing price (#199) and 
dividends per share (#26); D1 is a dummy variable taking value one if RET<0, zero otherwise;  D1_RET is an interactive 
variable equal to D1 times; RET ACC is a measure of accruals; defl is the deflator, i.e. Average Total Assets; other 
variables are as in Exhibit 2, panel A; 
2)  For the sake of parsimony the Modified-Jones models (Dechow et al., 1995a) are not reproduced here. Their specifications 
to estimate the coefficients are the same as in Jones (1991), and Extended Jones (1991). The estimation of  “normal 
accruals” uses these coefficients, and corrects the change in revenue for the change in trade receivables (#151), i.e. uses 
( t t REC REV D - D ); 
3)  Whenever other proxies for conservatism are used, they replace RET. 
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Exhibit  4:  Jones  (1991)  –  Difference  between  DAC  estimates  controlling/not 
controlling  for  the  asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses,  by 














































Fig. 4.1: For GN (solid line) and BN (dashed line), the graph plots the difference between the mean of DAC 
controlling (C)/not controlling (NC) for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses, by intervals of deflated 
earnings The interval width of earnings deflated by average total assets is 0.005. For example, a point on the 
dashed line can be read as the mean of BN/C minus the mean of BN/NC for the relevant interval. The sample size 
is 71,409 obs. 
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Exhibit 5: Difference between DAC estimates controlling/not controlling for the 
asymmetric  recognition  of  gains  and  losses,  by  intervals  of  deflated 
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Fig. 5.1: JONES (1991) model. For GN (solid line) and BN (dashed line) the graph plots the difference between 
the mean of DAC controlling (C)/not controlling (NC) for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses, by 
intervals of deflated earnings The interval width of earnings deflated by average total assets is 0.005. For example, 
a point on the dashed line can be read as the mean of BN/C minus the mean of BN/NC for the relevant interval. 
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Fig. 5.2: DECHOW and DICHEV (2002) model. For GN (solid line) and BN (dashed line) the graph plots the 
difference between the mean of DAC controlling (C)/not-controlling (NC) for the asymmetric recognition of gains 
and losses, by intervals of deflated earnings The interval width of earnings deflated by average total assets is 
0.005. For example, a point on the dashed line can be read as the mean of BN/C minus the mean of BN/NC for the 
relevant interval. The sample size is 59,455 obs. 